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I. INTRODUCTION 
“What does the Constitution mean?” Such is the opening line 
and central question of Professor Lawrence Solum’s article 
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“Semantic Originalism.”1 His answer: whatever it means, that 
meaning is dictated by the original public meaning of the consti-
tutional text.2 Neither his question nor his answer is particularly 
novel. Rather, what makes Solum’s article unique is his 
justification: original public meaning dictates how we should 
understand the constitutional text, not because doing so is fair or 
efficient, but because that’s how written language works.3 As such, 
“Semantic Originalism” purports to offer a theory of how the 
Constitution communicates to us as a matter of linguistic fact. 
According to Solum, constitutional communication is possible 
because the meaning of the Constitution is “fixed”—made stable 
and determinate—in writing by what ordinary speakers at the time 
of its writing understood it to mean.4 Once we determine this 
“fixed” meaning of the constitutional text, we’ve discovered the 
supreme law of the land, or so the argument goes.5 
But in committing himself so thoroughly to a theory of 
linguistic fact, Solum upends his own project. The problem lies in 
the fact that there are multiple, competing viable theories of 
language. In particular, the linguistic theory of moral realists 
deeply implicates moral and metaphysical commitments that 
honest interpreters of the Constitution who hold them are unlikely 
to part with except on compelling moral grounds. These moral 
realists argue that the meaning of language is (often) a direct 
function of the world itself, not just our mutual understanding of 
it.6 After all, it doesn’t make much sense to talk about what the 
phrase “tigers are felines” means without reference to actual tigers.7 
Likewise, for moral realists who believe that moral concepts are not 
 
 1. Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 1 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Illinois Public 
Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series No. 07-24, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com 
/abstract=1120244. 
 2. Id. at 1–2. 
 3. Id. at 30. 
 4. Id. at 2–4. 
 5. Id. at 2. 
 6. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the 
Worse?, in EDUCATING ONESELF IN PUBLIC: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 335, 338–43 
(2000) [hereinafter The Interpretive Turn]; Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 1061 
(1982) [hereinafter Moral Reality]; Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
2424 (1992) [hereinafter Moral Reality Revisited]. 
 7. See The Interpretive Turn, supra note 6, at 339. 
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mere social conventions, but objective facts, it doesn’t make sense 
to talk about “persons” or “equal protection” without reference to 
objective principles of personhood and justice.8 Under such com-
mitments, these facts about the world are what “fix” the meaning of 
the Constitution wherever it refers to them. 
To deal with the moral realist, Solum attempts to sidestep the 
issue by showing how moral realism fits into his theory of Semantic 
Originalism—that is, he tries to accommodate the moral realist 
through a minor revision to his theory.9 But minor it is not. In doing 
so, Solum fundamentally alters his theory and the role of “original 
public meaning” in constitutional interpretation, or so I will 
attempt to show. To do this, this Comment proceeds as follows: In 
Part II, I give some brief context and present Semantic 
Originalism’s major premises—the fixation thesis and the clause 
meaning thesis—by which constitutional meaning is purportedly 
fixed. Then, in Part III, I discuss moral realism, which entails a 
causal theory of meaning that is incompatible with the clause 
meaning thesis of Semantic Originalism. In Part IV, I lay out and 
reject Solum’s attempt to accommodate moral realism. Ultimately, 
I conclude that his attempt to square Semantic Originalism with 
moral realism results in a theory that displaces its originalist 
commitments so far that it might not rightly be called an originalist 
theory at all. Finally, in Part V, I summarize and conclude. 
II. SEMANTIC ORIGINALISM, FIXATION, AND 
ORDINARY PUBLIC MEANING 
A. Semantic Originalism’s Place Among Originalist Theories 
1. Originalism as a family of theories 
“Originalism” refers to a family of related theories of consti-
tutional interpretation and construction.10 The core premise of 
 
 8. See Moral Reality Revisited, supra note 6, at 2481. 
 9. See infra Section IV.B. 
 10. Solum, supra note 1, at 11. For an informative discussion regarding the difference 
between interpretation as “the enterprise of discerning the semantic content of the 
constitution” and construction as “the activity of further specifying constitutional rules when 
the original public meaning of the text is vague (or underdeterminate for some other 
reason)[,]” see id. at 18–19. Semantic Originalism is primarily a theory about constitutional 
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originalism that ties these various theories together is the “fixation 
thesis.”11 The fixation thesis will be further discussed below,12 but 
its basic idea is relatively intuitive: the meaning of the Constitution 
is “fixed” at the time of its framing and ratification. Or more accu-
rately, the semantic content of a constitutional utterance is fixed at 
the time of its framing and ratification.13 Inasmuch as Semantic 
Originalism affirms the fixation thesis, it fits squarely within the 
originalist family. Moreover, because the fixation thesis provides 
the “unifying content” that binds the family of originalist theories 
together, it “plays a focal role in debates about originalism.”14 
2. Normative and Semantic Originalism 
Originalist theories fall into two broad categories: normative 
and semantic.15 Normative theories attempt to influence us; that is, 
they purport to tell us what we should believe or how we ought to 
act. As such, normative theories and the arguments supporting 
them can generally be understood to regard “the moral or ethical 
status of reasons for action, evaluations of states of affairs, and 
judgements about human character.”16 A normative linguistic 
theory, then, aims to tell us how various features of language ought 
to be understood or used because such an understanding or use is 
best for ethical or moral reasons. For example, Justice Antonin 
Scalia, one of the best-known advocates of originalism, argued for 
a version of originalism on the grounds that to do otherwise “is 
 
interpretation (i.e., discernment of semantic content), though it has important implications 
for constitutional construction. My discussion in this Comment is limited to interpretation, 
though an investigation of the implications of metaphysical and moral realism, or perhaps 
naturalism in general, will be an important endeavor for anyone who wants to build 
naturalism into a full constitutional theory. 
 11. Solum, supra note 1, at 2. 
 12. See infra Section II.C.1. 
 13. This sentence contains technical language (e.g., “semantic content” and 
“constitutional utterance”) that will be further explained below. See infra Section II.C.1. 
 14. Solum, supra note 1, at 11 (emphasis omitted). Solum emphasizes the essential 
nature of the fixation thesis for originalist theories, stating that, “If the claim that the semantic 
content of the provisions of the Constitution were fixed at their times of origin were false, 
then the foundations of originalism would be shaken and all or almost all the members of 
the family of originalist theories would no longer be viable.” Id. 
 15. For a fuller treatment of this distinction as it relates to Semantic Originalism, see 
id. at 28–30. 
 16. Id. at 28. 
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simply incompatible with democratic government—or indeed, 
even with fair government.”17 To argue in favor of adopting 
originalism on the grounds that it best comports with the values of 
democracy and fairness is to argue for it on normative grounds. 
Semantic theories, on the other hand, are descriptive and 
purport to tell us things as they are.18 Specifically, “[a] semantic 
theory tries to explain what meaning is, and any theory of meaning 
will have to describe what is and what is not a meaningful 
expression as well as the systematic relations between words and 
what they mean.”19 Thus, rather than making claims about what is 
morally best or most consistent with our ethical values, semantic 
theories attempt to describe the most accurate way to understand 
linguistic meaning, given the available evidence. So understood, 
semantic theories can be compared to scientific theories. For 
example, heliocentrism does not argue that we should accept that 
the earth orbits the sun because such a belief or practice more 
appropriately comports with the requirements of justice or fairness 
or some other ethical claim. Instead, it argues that, as a matter of 
fact, the earth simply does orbit the sun because such a view 
comports best to the evidence that we have. Thus, heliocentrism is 
preferable to geocentrism, because it more accurately describes the 
way the empirical world is.20 Similarly, Solum asserts that the heart 
of a semantic theory lies in the idea that “[m]eanings . . . are facts 
determined by the evidence.”21 Moreover, because legal texts, such 
 
 17. Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Common-Law Courts in 
a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution 
and Laws, Address at Princeton University (Mar. 8-9, 1995), in 18 THE TANNER LECTURES ON 
HUMAN VALUES 77, 92 (1997); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 
(2008) (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was 
written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and 
ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’ Normal meaning may of course include 
an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been 
known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 18. This is related to the famous “is-ought” distinction insofar as facts on the ground 
do or don’t impact what we ought to do. However, there is likely an implicit psychologically 
normative move in claiming that a theory is “most accurate.” 
 19. A.P. Martinich, Introduction, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 2 (A.P. Martinich 
ed., 5th ed. 2008). 
 20. While this may seem obvious now, it was not always so. It is well known that 
Copernicus’ heliocentric model of the solar system faced heavy resistance and criticism by 
late medieval and early modern philosophers, generally on normative grounds. 
 21. Solum, supra note 1, at 36. Solum notes: 
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as constitutions, make up a subset of linguistic expressions, “[t]he 
question whether a given reading of a legal text preserves its 
meaning . . . is a factual question.”22 
It is important at this juncture to note that the fact that semantic 
theories, like scientific theories, are descriptive does not divorce 
them completely from normative claims. Indeed, there is often an 
implicit normative element accompanying any descriptive theory: 
because the Earth revolves around the sun, we should act accord-
ingly, especially when it comes to charting the course of our next 
probe to Mars and other projects involving Earth’s place in the solar 
system. Thus, although descriptive theories make normative 
claims, they differ from normative theories in that descriptive 
claims do the conceptual heavy lifting; normative claims simply 
demand that we comport ourselves to reality. Semantic theories are 
no different—inasmuch as they purport to accurately describe how 
linguistic meaning works, they too will carry normative implica-
tions. As to Semantic Originalism in particular, Solum makes this 
normative element of his semantic theory explicit: although Seman-
tic Originalism is a “mixed theory” involving a modest normative 
element, it rests primarily on semantic claims,23 and “[t]o the extent 
that Semantic Originalism does make a normative (moral or ethical) 
claim, it is simply that we have a defeasible obligation to respect 
the original meaning of the constitution to the extent that it is 
law.”24 In other words, because the supreme law of the land is the 
semantic meaning of the Constitution, we should act accordingly.  
 
This point is so obvious in a variety of contexts that it is taken for granted. 
Textbooks about semantics written for students of linguistics do not discuss the 
normative reasons for and against various theories of semantic meaning. 
Translators of chemistry texts or product manuals do not (and should not) ask 
whether they should use the translation that best expresses the semantic content 
of the original or some other translation that might be preferred on normative 
grounds. Of course, translations can be altered on normative grounds. For 
example, in cultures with puritanical sexual mores, the translation of a racy novel 
might be bowdlerized: a grope might become a touch, intercourse a kiss. The 
crucial point is that a bowdlerized translation alters and does not preserve 
semantic content. No normative argument can bestow the property of “accuracy” 
on a bowdlerized translation. We may prefer that our children read the 
bowdlerized translation, but this preference does not change the semantic content 
of the original. 
Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 30. 
 24. Id. at 10; see also id. at 127–28. 
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As we have seen, Semantic Originalism by its very name makes 
two very important claims. First, it is an originalist theory, which 
means that it affirms the fixation thesis—it insists that the meaning 
of the Constitution was fixed at the time of its framing and 
ratification. Second, it is a semantic theory and thus purports to 
give factual answers about what constitutional provisions mean, 
given the way language works. However, although semantic 
theories all share a common purpose, they do not necessarily agree 
in every respect. One of the most important ways that different 
originalist semantic theories distinguish themselves is how they 
answer the question “What fixes the semantic content of a consti-
tutional utterance?” Semantic Originalism’s answer is “original 
public meaning.” 
3. New Originalism and original public meaning 
In semantic originalist theories, “original public meaning” is 
shorthand for the conventional semantic meaning of a consti-
tutional provision as understood by ordinary but competent 
speakers at the time of its framing and ratification.25 The idea that 
the meaning of constitutional utterances is fixed by “the public 
meaning of the [constitutional] text that was adopted” is the dis-
tinguishing feature of “New Originalism.”26 Or as Solum explains, 
new originalists and other original public meaning originalists 
believe that “meaning is fixed by the general pattern of usage at the 
time of constitutional utterance.”27 
New Originalism’s focus on original public meaning contrasts 
with other originalist semantic theories. For example, early adopt-
ers of originalism held a view known as “original intentions 
originalism,” which claims that the semantic content of consti-
tutional utterances is fixed by the subjective intentions of the 
 
 25. Id. at 4. 
 26. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 610 (2004). 
Whether the original public meaning is understood to be the factual meaning of the 
Constitution or merely the asserted meaning of its provisions is likely to change depending 
on the specific approach taken by the particular theory advancing original public meaning 
originalism. For example, it may depend on whether the justification is semantic or 
normative. See supra Section II.A.2. 
 27. Solum, supra note 1, at 4. 
 
004.MCMURRAY_FIN3_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  7:46 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
702 
framers.28 That is, what matters is what Jefferson and Hamilton 
thought of the meaning of constitutional provisions, inasmuch as it 
can be ascertained from the constitutional text itself or other 
sources of evidence, such as the Federalist Papers. Because of this, 
original intentions originalists believe that meaning is fixed not by 
objective facts about usage, but by the mental states that existed in 
the minds of the framers when they wrote the Constitution.29 This 
view has been heavily criticized throughout its history on 
numerous grounds, both normative and semantic.30 A full dis-
cussion of these criticisms is unnecessary here, but a unifying 
theme is the enormous difficulty of attributing a stable, monolithic 
intentional state to a body of distinct individuals with various 
intentions, beliefs, and understandings regarding the meaning of 
constitutional provisions throughout a drafting and ratification 
process.31 Suffice it to say that, as a development of originalism, one 
of the purported virtues of New Originalism—and Semantic 
Originalism in particular—is that it avoids these difficulties. 
 
 28. Id. at 13–14; see also RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1977); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles 
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 17 (1971); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially 
Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1317–18 (2006) 
(advancing an evolution of original intentions originalism called “original understanding” 
originalism that defines “originalism” as “the theory that the original understanding of those 
who wrote and ratified various constitutional provisions determines their current 
meaning”); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 695 
(1976) (“Although the substitution of some other set of values for those which may be 
derived from the language and intent of the framers is not urged in so many words, that is 
surely the thrust of the message.”); Edwin Meese III, Att’y Gen., Speech Before the American 
Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTI-
TUTION (Paul G. Cassell ed., 1986), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/the-great 
-debate-attorney-general-ed-meese-iii-july-9-1985 (last visited Nov. 19, 2018) (“The text of 
the document and the original intention of those who framed it would be the judicial 
standard in giving effect to the Constitution.”). 
 29. See Whittington, supra note 26, at 599–600 (pointing to the prominence of original 
intentions originalism in the 1980s, as demonstrated by Senator Sam Ervin’s question for 
Thurgood Marshall at his confirmation hearing: “Is not the role of the Supreme Court simply 
to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers of this Constitution and the people 
who ratified the Constitution?”). 
 30. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 885 (1985). 
 31. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 30, at 214–22. Solum discusses the “problem of collective 
intentions” in depth. Solum, supra note 1, at 42–49. 
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Compared to the task of pinning down collective mental states,32 
ascribing a more or less objective common usage of a word or 
phrase is a straightforward endeavor.  
4. The role of Semantic Originalism 
New Originalism, however, has drawn new critics.33 Semantic 
Originalism, as developed by Solum, is a development within New 
Originalism intended to respond to these criticisms—or rather, to 
demonstrate how these criticisms have missed the mark.34 Accord-
ing to Solum, the problem with recent arguments against New 
Originalism is that “their criticisms [are] premised on the notion 
that the debates about the New Originalism are fundamentally 
normative (ethical or moral) and not semantic (linguistic or meaning-
focused).”35 That is, they treat New Originalism as a purely norma-
tive theory. Pure normative originalism can be summed up in a 
single thesis: “Constitutional practice should be substantially 
guided by the original public meaning of the text.”36 In response, 
Solum attempts “to reinterpret the debate from the perspective of 
the philosophy of language”37 and thereby show that by missing 
the semantic component of New Originalism, critics have advanced 
their arguments ignorant of the fact that they are arguing against 
the way language and constitutional communication actually work. 
Thus, in order to place New Originalism on stronger theoretical 
grounds, Solum’s most important goal is to demonstrate that pure 
Semantic Originalism is true.38 Pure Semantic Originalism can also 
be summarized in a single thesis: “[T]he semantic content of the text 
of a constitution is (roughly) the original meaning of the text as it 
 
 32. Solum, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 33. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 
(2007); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Thomas B. Colby 
& Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009); Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting 
Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185 (2008). 
 34. See Solum, supra note 1, at 24. 
 35. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 36. Id. at 30. 
 37. Id. at 26–27. 
 38. See id. at 128 (“At this point, the most important work of ‘Semantic Originalism’ 
has been accomplished. . . . Once pure semantic originalism is on the table . . . then a 
transformation of the debate over originalism become [sic] possible.”). 
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was fixed at the time of framing and ratification.”39 If he is 
successful,40 then presumably the stakes will be significantly raised 
for opponents of New Originalism: anti-originalists will have to 
demonstrate that normative concerns override the actual meaning 
of the Constitution. 
To summarize, Semantic Originalism is a semantic theory of 
constitutional meaning. First, it is originalist in that it adheres to the 
fixation thesis, the idea that the meaning of the Constitution was 
fixed at the time of its framing and ratification. Second, it is a 
semantic theory with normative implications rather than a 
normative theory with semantic implications: it purports to direct 
us to the actual semantic content of the Constitution as a function 
of the facts and necessary features of language that enable success-
ful communication. Finally, Semantic Originalism is a development 
of New Originalism because it both claims that the semantic 
content of constitutional utterances is fixed by ordinary public 
meaning and seeks to save New Originalism from recent, purely 
normative criticisms. 
B. Semantic Originalism: A Theory of Language and Interpretation 
In this Section, I lay out the essential premises of Semantic 
Originalism in order to demonstrate that they are inconsistent with 
full-blooded moral realism—the position that moral concepts like 
justice and fairness41 exist and that the words that refer to them are 
defined by their real qualities rather than our contingent thoughts 
and feelings about them.42 In particular, I show that in his attempt 
to accommodate the moral realist, Solum’s semantic commitments 
ultimately swallow his originalist commitments.43 
 
 39. Id. at 30. 
 40. Note that I am assuming the accuracy of Semantic Originalism’s theses for the 
purpose of showing its incompatibility with moral realism. While there may be other 
concerns with Semantic Originalism—and with the fixation thesis in particular—they are not 
my concern here. 
 41. Here and throughout the rest of this Comment, I use italics when I intend to refer 
to the underlying concept or object to which a word refers, and I use quotation marks when 
I intend to refer to the word itself; thus, tiger denotes the physical feline itself, while “tiger” 
denotes only the word, not its content. 
 42. See infra Section III.A. 
 43. See infra Part IV. 
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As discussed, Semantic Originalism advances a theory that 
purports to help us answer the question “What does the Consti-
tution mean?”44 For Solum, the “Constitution” that we are 
concerned with is not the physical document itself, but rather the 
language of the specific legal provisions contained in the physical 
document.45 Moreover, while “meaning” can refer to “implications, 
consequences, or applications,” in the context of Semantic Origi-
nalism, it refers to the “linguistic meaning or semantic content” of 
the written language comprising the Constitution.46 
To spare us from the imprecision of ordinary language, Solum 
reformulates the question “What does the Constitution mean?” 
using technical terms borrowed from philosophy of language.47  
First, instead of “the Constitution,” Solum uses the more precise 
terms constitutional “utterance” and “utterance token.”48 “Utter-
ances” are “specific events, the intentional acts of speakers at times 
and places, typically involving language.”49 In short, “an ‘utter-
ance’ is a ‘saying’ or ‘writing.’”50 Utterances can be further specified 
as “utterance tokens” and “utterance types.” An utterance token is 
an utterance “on a particular occasion” and, therefore, is indexed 
by the time and place of its occurrence.51 An utterance type can be 
understood to be the general category to which an expression token 
belongs; for instance, terms, phrases, and clauses.52 Or in Solum’s 
 
 44. Solum, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 45. Even this sense of “Constitution” might be considered ambiguous, vague, or 
underdetermined. See id. at 36, 56–57 (discussing constitutional implicature). 
 46. Id. at 2 (italics omitted). 
 47. Id. at 31–38. 
 48. Id. at 34. 
 49. Kepa Korta & John Perry, Pragmatics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Nov. 28, 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatics/ (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2018); see also P.F. Strawson, On Referring, 59 MIND 320, 327 (1950) 
(discussing “types”). 
 50. Solum, supra note 1, at 34. 
 51. Id. (italics omitted). 
 52. See Linda Wetzel, Types and Tokens, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Apr. 28, 2006), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries 
/types-tokens/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). For example, the sentence “Rose is a rose is a rose 
is a rose” contains three word types—”rose,” “is,” and “a”—but ten word tokens, one for 
each particular word that appears in the sentence. Id. As Wetzel explains, “Types are 
generally said to be abstract and unique; tokens are concrete particulars, composed of ink, 
pixels of light . . . on a computer screen, electronic strings of dots and dashes, smoke signals, 
hand signals, sound waves, etc.” Id. 
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plain terms, “An ‘utterance type’ is just the string of words 
considered as something that could be said on more than one 
particular occasion.”53 A “constitutional utterance,” then, is a 
specific instantiation of constitutional language, such as a clause, 
indexed to its “time of origin, encompassing the period roughly 
contemporaneous with the framing (or drafting) and ratification (or 
formal legal approval) of the particular clause or amendment.”54 
Second, “mean” or “meaning” can be substituted for “semantic 
content.”55 As discussed, “semantic content” refers to linguistic (or 
semantic) meaning. Moreover, Solum is careful to specify that his 
theory is concerned with “sentence” or “expression” meaning: “the 
conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases that 
constitute [an] utterance.”56 Using these terms, Semantic Original-
ism purports to help us answer the question “What is the semantic 
content of a Constitutional utterance?” Solum’s answer in “the 
language of high constitutional theory” is this: “The semantic 
content of [the] Constitution was fixed at the time of utterance by 
conventional semantic meaning. . . .”57 Thus, to discover what the 
Constitution means, we must look to its original public meaning. 
C. Fixing Semantic Content: Fixation and Conventional Meaning 
Semantic Originalism’s “central claim” is that “constitutional 
law includes rules with content that are fixed by the original public 
meaning of the text—the conventional semantic meaning of the 
words and phrases in context.”58 Solum develops this claim 
through four theses, which are the pillars of his theory. The first 
 
 53. Solum, supra note 1, at 34. 
 54. Id. at 4. Solum recognizes that written language is distinct from spoken utterances, 
but he largely attempts to put controversies regarding their distinct qualities aside. Id. at 35. 
He does seem to argue, however, that his theory of Semantic Originalism is more or less 
necessary for constitutional communication to be possible across time. This is almost a kind 
of Kantian “transcendental argument” by which he assumes that constitutional 
communication of definite semantic content is possible and Semantic Originalism accounts 
for its possibility. See id. at 31–66. Because I intend to address Solum’s arguments on his own 
terms, I have not tried to address the merits of this part of his argument. 
 55. Id. at 2–3. 
 56. Id. at 34–35 (citing PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 3–143 (1989)). 
 57. Solum, supra note 1, at 173 (italics omitted). 
 58. Id. at 2. 
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three—the fixation thesis,59 the clause meaning thesis,60 and the 
contribution thesis61—are semantic theses. They develop a theory 
of what determines the semantic content of constitutional 
utterances and how that content relates to constitutional law. The 
fourth thesis—the fidelity thesis62—is a normative one. It argues 
that because the semantic content is the law of the land, we owe a 
moral duty to follow it. 
The fixation thesis claims that the semantic content of 
constitutional utterances is fixed at the time of their adoption—the 
time of framing and ratification.63 The clause meaning thesis claims 
that the semantic content of constitutional utterances is given by, or 
fixed by, the original public meaning of those utterances.64 The 
contribution thesis claims that the semantic content of consti-
tutional utterances contributes to the supreme law of the land.65 The 
fidelity thesis argues that because the semantic content of 
constitutional utterances makes up part of the law, it morally 
obligates us unless there is some other contrary and sufficiently 
overriding moral consideration.66 Together, Semantic Originalism 
can be summed up in a technical slogan: “The semantic content of 
[the] Constitution was fixed at the time of utterance by con-
ventional semantic meaning, and the conventions of legal practice 
make that content the supreme law of the land to which officials 
and citizens owe fidelity as a matter of political morality.”67 
For the purposes of this Comment, only the first two theses—
fixation and clause meaning—need be explained in greater detail. 
1. Fixation thesis 
As previously discussed, the fixation thesis is the central claim 
that binds originalist theories together.68 The fixation thesis asserts 
 
 59. Id. at 2–4, 59–67; see infra Section II.C.1. 
 60. Solum, supra note 1, at 5, 58–59; see infra Section II.C.2. 
 61. Solum, supra note 1, at 6–8, 134–49. 
 62. Id. at 8–9, 149–60. 
 63. Id. at 2. 
 64. Id. at 5. 
 65. Id. at 6. 
 66. Id. at 8. 
 67. Id. at 173 (italics omitted). 
 68. Id. at 2; see supra Section II.A.1. 
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that the semantic content of the Constitution—specifically as 
constitutional utterances—was established at the time it was 
framed and ratified.69 The thesis can be abstracted to make it 
clearer: “The semantic content of an utterance[] is fixed at the time 
of utterance under normal conditions.”70 This adds a historical 
dimension to interpretation because “[w]ords and phrases mean in 
context, and the context includes time and place.”71 The fun-
damental justification72 of this view is the simple observation of the 
seemingly uncontroversial linguistic fact73 that the meanings of 
words and phrases can—and oftentimes do—change over time.74 
Solum provides two examples to illustrate this phenomenon. 
The first example considers the semantic content of the word 
“deer” in the context of a letter written during the twelfth century.75 
 
 69. Because the framing and ratification of the Constitution occurred over the course 
of time and not all at once, “[t]his period may be extended over many years.” Solum, supra 
note 1, at 2 n.3, 59 n.178. 
 70. Id. at 59. For the purposes of this Comment, I simply accept this assertion as true. 
However, it is unclear whether written language, which is almost always encountered out of 
its relevant space, time, and history, can fix meaning in the way Solum asserts. The idea that 
written language provides accessible semantic content fixed in time is further complicated 
by the fact that texts are never encountered in isolation free from the interpreter’s own 
background and understanding. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 
(Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., paperback ed. 2013) (1975). 
 71. Id. at 60. A rather technical way of expressing this claim would be to say that for 
any utterance x and any time t, if x is uttered at t, then the semantic content of x is fixed at t. 
 72. There are other justifications for the fixation thesis, as Solum indicates. For 
example, the fixation of meaning at the time of written utterances (like the Constitution) is 
often argued for as the function of writing—that is, the purpose of written language just is 
to fix meaning through time. Id. at 3 (citing Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for 
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 611–29 (1999); RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION (2004)). 
 73. I say “seemingly uncontroversial linguistic fact” because it is not so clear to me 
that the meaning of a word does or even can change. It seems to me that the “corruption” of 
a word through deviant uses does not in fact alter the meaning of an already existing word, 
but rather creates a new word—which has a distinct though perhaps conceptually related 
meaning—that has the same word token and that replaces the old word in the common 
vocabulary. Solum’s account of the change of meanings of words works only if words are 
identified solely with their signs, and a sign might acquire new and different senses over 
time. If a sign gains a new sense and loses an older one, then the meaning of the word has 
substantially changed. However, if words qua words require both a meaning (semantic 
content) and a sign (word token), then it does not make sense to say that the meaning of a 
word has changed—there would simply be a new word, albeit with an identical sign. I am 
grateful to my teacher and friend Dr. David Jensen for helping me to clarify this alternative 
account of word-meaning change. 
 74. Solum, supra note 1, at 3, 59. 
 75. Id. at 3. 
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Today, the word “deer” denotes a ruminant mammal in the family 
Cervidae. During the twelfth century, however, the word “deer” in 
Middle English referred to “a beast or animal of any kind.”76 The 
difference in meaning between the two time periods demonstrates 
how the meaning of a word can substantially change over time. 
Accordingly, the only way to reliably understand the semantic 
content of the word “deer” when it appears in an ordinary letter 
written in the twelfth century is “in the light of the conventional 
semantic meaning at the time of writing[.]”77 Moreover, to try to 
import the twenty-first century meaning of “deer” would be to 
“make a type of factual error, i.e., a linguistic mistake.”78 
The second example moves us into a constitutional context. 
Article IV of the Constitution of 1789 uses the phrase “domestic 
violence.”79 Today, the commonly understood semantic meaning of 
“domestic violence” is “‘intimate partner abuse, battering, or wife-
beating,’” understood as “‘physical, sexual, psychological, and 
economic abuse that takes place in the context of an intimate 
relationship, including marriage.’”80 According to Solum, so long as 
this contemporary meaning of “domestic violence” was unknown 
in the eighteenth century, any attempt to interpret Article IV as 
including a reference to child or spouse abuse “would simply be a 
linguistic mistake” akin to the error of interpreting a twelfth-
century utterance of “deer” as limited to mammals in the family 
of Cervidae.81 
The argument these examples are supposed to illuminate is 
fairly straightforward: if we are to make any sense of how the 
 
 76. Id. (citing SOL STEINMETZ, SEMANTIC ANTICS: HOW AND WHY WORDS CHANGE 
MEANING 49–50 (Random House 2008)). 
 77. Solum, supra note 1, at 3. 
 78. Id. 
 79. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; 
and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be 
convened) against domestic Violence.” (italics added)). 
 80. Solum, supra note 1, at 3–4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, Glossary, in TRAPPED BY INEQUALITY: BHUTANESE REFUGEE WOMEN IN NEPAL 
5, 6 (2003), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/nepal0903/nepal0903full.pdf). 
 81. Solum, supra note 1, at 4. Lamentably, Professor Solum gives no indication of what 
“domestic violence” may have meant in 1787. But inasmuch as my Comment attempts to 
address Solum’s argument on its own terms, it is not necessary to try to find out (even if it 
might be helpful). 
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meaning of words change over time, we must accept that while 
utterance types may change meaning over time, the meaning of 
utterance tokens—specific instantiations of utterance types—is 
fixed by historical context. Solum’s defense of the fixation thesis 
does not end here,82 but there is no need to go into his specific 
responses to various objections.83 My argument below implicates 
the fixation thesis only in part; in fact, it assumes the fixation thesis, 
or at least a form of it. 
The crux of the dispute regarding fixation is that the meaning 
of certain kinds of utterances is indeed fixed, but fixed by what? 
Semantic Originalism has built into the fixation thesis an answer: 
historical context. A full-blooded realist will reject that this 
assertion is true for all kinds of utterances. Specifically, she will—
depending on how far reaching her realist commitments are—reject 
that it holds for certain entities, such as natural kinds and moral 
kinds. These “kinds” are entities in the world that “reflect[] the 
structure of the natural [or moral] world rather than the interests 
and actions of human beings.”84 The realist will accept a more 
neutral way of formulating the fixation thesis: She will agree that 
the semantic content of utterance tokens is determinate85 and 
unchanging, i.e., “fixed.” However, she will disagree that the 
fixation of meaning is simply a function of historical context. 
According to the realist, the world itself—or our best theory of it—
fixes semantic content. 
2. Clause meaning thesis 
The clause meaning thesis can perhaps be best understood in 
relation to the fixation thesis. As discussed above,86 the fixation 
thesis advances two distinct propositions: (1) the semantic content 
of utterance tokens—including constitutional utterance tokens—is 
 
 82. For his full defense, see id. at 59–67. 
 83. For example, he responds to objections arguing that the meaning of utterance 
tokens can change over time, id. at 61–64, and that readers can assign new meaning to old 
texts, id. at 64–67. 
 84. Alexander Bird & Emma Tobin, Natural Kinds, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Sept. 17, 2008), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr 
2018/entries/natural-kinds/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
 85. This is not to say that it is necessarily determinable. 
 86. See supra Section II.C.1. 
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fixed (determinate and permanent), and (2) fixation is a function of 
temporal-historical context.87 In comparison, the clause meaning 
thesis is the assertion that the relevant historical context that fixes 
semantic content is ordinary public meaning, i.e., the conventional 
meaning of the utterance token understood by ordinary but 
linguistically proficient speakers at the time of the utterance.88 In 
short, the semantic content of a constitutional utterance token is 
its clause meaning, which is the utterance token’s ordinary 
public meaning. 
The basic argument for clause meaning flows from the neces-
sary conditions for the possibility of successful constitutional com-
munication.89 According to Semantic Originalism, “conventional 
semantic meaning provides the only satisfactory account” of this 
possibility.90 By contrast, original intentions originalism fails on 
these grounds. Original intentions originalism asserts that the 
semantic content of constitutional utterance tokens is given by the 
internal mental states of the framers at the time of the Constitution’s 
drafting and ratification.91 However, this poses a significant 
problem: the Constitution was drafted and ratified by a multitude 
of different individuals in a variety of times and places. Because of 
this, “[t]he intentional mental states of the multitude with respect 
to a given constitutional provision (their purposes, hopes, fears, 
expectations, and so forth) will themselves be multitudinous and 
inaccessible.”92 This fact has two consequences. First, a multitu-
dinous body of intentional states cannot provide a consistent “non-
contradictory and not radically ambiguous” semantic content.93 
 
 87. Note that Solum does not divide the fixation thesis into two distinct claims. I have 
divided it this way for conceptual clarity. I think that Solum’s decision to present the fixation 
thesis as one claim is motivated by objections that Semantic Originalism is not “technically” 
originalism. By arguing that the fixation thesis as he has presented it reflects the core content 
of Originalism, he is able to claim that Semantic Originalism is at home within the Originalist 
family. However, I believe that this has potentially introduced some conceptual confusion. 
 88. See Solum, supra note 1, at 5. As such, Solum explains that clause meaning is the 
“semantic and pragmatic equivalent” to Original Public Meaning Originalism (New 
Originalism), but they are distinguishable because clause meaning extricates original public 
meaning from the normative claims of New Originalism. Id. at 50–51. 
 89. See id. at 5. 
 90. Id. (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. at 4. 
 92. Id. at 5. 
 93. Id. 
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Second, the inconsistent and ambiguous nature of a multitudinous 
conglomerate of intentional states is epistemically inaccessible to 
legal practitioners who are expected and required to engage in 
constitutional interpretation.94 As a result, if semantic content is 
given by the framers’ intentions, then genuine constitutional com-
munication is impossible. 
How then is successful constitutional communication possible? 
Solum proposes that the possibility lies in “the fact that the framers 
and ratifiers could rely on the accessibility of the public 
meaning . . . of the words, phrases, and clauses that constitute the 
Constitution.”95 In other words, original public meaning makes 
constitutional communication possible. This view purportedly has 
the added benefit that such public meanings are not only stable 
over time but also recoverable if lost.96 If this is true, then clause 
meaning understood as original public meaning is both consistent 
and epistemically accessible, thereby avoiding the problems that 
plague original intentions originalism. 
Solum’s defense of the clause meaning thesis expands on these 
arguments and adds a layer of sophistication, positing four impor-
tant modifications.97  
First, the domain of contextual facts that may be considered 
when determining the conventional semantic meaning of a 
constitutional utterance is limited to those facts that were publicly 
available, or the “publicly available context.”98 Contextual facts 
were publicly available only if they were of a nature such that the 
framers would have reasonably believed that they were common 
knowledge to practitioners of constitutional law.99 Solum explains 
that “[t]he precise contours of the public context can only be 
defined by careful inquiry, but one element is indisputable: the 
publicly available context of each individual clause includes the 
 
 94. Id. Because of this epistemic inaccessibility, Justice Scalia argued that it is immoral 
to interpret the Constitution according to the intentions of the framers and compared doing 
so to Roman Emperor Nero’s alleged practice of entrapping his citizens by publishing laws 
on pillars so high that they could not see them. Scalia, supra note 17, at 92. 
 95. Solum, supra note 1, at 5. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 50–58. 
 98. Id. at 52–54. 
 99. Id. 
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whole constitutional text.”100 Moreover, “the publicly available 
context may include facts about the general point or purpose of [a 
constitutional] provision (as opposed to ‘the intention of the 
author’) and those facts may resolve ambiguities.”101 
Second, legal terms of art can be accommodated via acceptance 
of a “division of linguistic labor.”102 Terms of art risk violating the 
premise of original public meaning because by definition a term of 
art has a specialized meaning that falls outside what an ordinary 
speaker of the language would know.103 However, because 
ordinary speakers would presumably recognize that terms of art 
have special meanings, ordinary speakers can assume and accept 
that the special meaning is publicly available to members of the 
relevant linguistic community that utilizes the term.104 This kind of 
linguistic deference legitimizes terms of art within the theory of 
clause meaning. 
Third, the Constitution may have implicit but publicly 
accessible meanings that go beyond the precise semantic content of 
the text.105 This is also known as “constitutional implicature.”106 
Solum gives the example of McCulloch v. Maryland,107 in which 
Justice Marshall argues that the power to establish post offices and 
postal roads implies the power to transport and deliver the mail.108 
The purpose of this modification is not to assert that there are in 
fact any instances of genuine implicit meaning, but rather to assert 
that if such instances do exist, then they “are part of the meaning of 
the Constitution and they should be understood as within the 
‘theory of clause meaning[.]’“109 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. Solum recognizes that his account is incomplete and that “[a] full account of 
clause meaning would include a theory of the criteria for inclusion in the set of facts that 
constitute the publicly available context of constitutional utterance[,]” but he brackets the 
issue as important for actual construction and interpretation of the Constitution, not for 
advancing public context as a modification to clause meaning. Id. 
 102. Id. at 54–56. 
 103. Id. at 54. 
 104. Id. at 55. 
 105. Id. at 56–57. 
 106. Id. at 56. 
 107. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 108. Solum, supra note 1, at 56–57 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 417). 
 109. Solum, supra note 1, at 57. 
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Finally, the constitutional text contains words and phrases that 
did not exist prior to its drafting and ratification.110 These are called 
“constitutional stipulations.”111 As Solum points out, “Senate” and 
“House of Representatives” do not predate the Constitution, but 
rather “[t]he Constitution brought these institutions into being and 
named them.”112 The semantic content of constitutional stipulations 
is therefore fixed by the conventional semantic meaning “as of the 
moments of drafting or ratification.”113 
Together, the fixation thesis and the clause meaning thesis with 
Solum’s modifications can be summarized as the following: 
Semantic Originalism is the view that the meaning (semantic 
content and illocutionary force of the Constitution) is the clause 
meaning of the Constitution at the time of adoption and ratification 
to the relevant audience, given the division of linguistic labor and 
the publicly available context, plus any additional content and 
force that results from necessary constitutional implicature or 
stipulated meanings.114 
For the sake of conceptual clarity, I think this summation 
should be rephrased as two slightly modified premises. Semantic 
Originalism is a theory of constitutional interpretation that holds 
(1) the semantic content of an utterance is fixed (determinate and 
stable), and (2) the semantic content is, or is defined by, the 
conventional semantic meaning of the utterance at the time it was 
uttered. At this point, Semantic Originalism has been explained in 
sufficient detail to proceed to the next stage of this Comment: a 
discussion of moral realism and its semantic implications. Put 
simply, the full-blooded moral realist will accept premise (1) but 
reject premise (2). 
III. MORAL REALISM AND MEANING 
In its present form, Semantic Originalism is a theory that has its 
roots in the philosophical tradition of viewing language and 
 
 110. Id. at 57–58. 
 111. Id. at 57. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 58. 
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meaning as fundamentally conventional. That is, it views meaning 
as a function of the way language is used.115 Such a view of language 
was given much force in the analytic tradition of philosophy by the 
later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein.116 Accordingly, discerning 
meaning is largely an investigative process in which one looks at 
particular instances of language use—or as Wittgenstein would 
say, “[D]on’t think, but look!”117 However, the claim that meaning 
is conventional usage runs counter to another view with an equally 
distinguished pedigree: the causal theory of reference. Briefly, the 
causal theory of reference claims that the semantic content of a 
certain class of terms—such as “water,” “tiger,” and possibly 
“justice”—is fixed, not by mental states or conventional use, but by 
a causal connection to the entities to which they refer. This is the 
view that, as Hilary Putnam put it, “[M]eaning[] just ain’t in the 
head!”118 For full-blooded moral realists, these relevant entities 
include moral entities, or moral facts. 
A. What Is Moral Realism? 
Moral realism in its robust form is the view that there are moral 
facts—that “moral terms refer to real properties in the world.”119 
This means that “hard-core” moral realists believe that claims such 
as “Napalming babies is bad” and “Buying and selling each other 
is depraved” purportedly report facts in much the same way the 
 
 115. See id. at 51 (“[T]he relevant question in the recognition or discovery[] of clause 
meaning is, ‘How would the Constitution of 1789 have been understood by a competent 
speaker of American English at the time it was adopted?’”). 
 116. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS 4 (1958) (“[I]f we had to 
name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use.”); 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 20 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953) 
[hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS] (“For a large class of cases—though not for 
all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word 
is its use in the language.”). For a helpful summary of Wittgenstein’s views on language, see 
Anat Biletzki & Anat Matar, Ludwig Wittgenstein, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Nov. 8, 2002), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries 
/wittgenstein/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 117. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 116, at 31.  
 118. 2 HILARY PUTNAM, The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’ in MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 227 (1975) (italics omitted). 
 119. Jaegwon Kim, Moral Kinds and Natural Kinds: What’s the Difference—for a 
Naturalist?, 8 PHIL. ISSUES 293, 293 (1997); Moral Reality, supra note 6 (defending moral realism 
against its major objections); Moral Reality Revisited, supra note 6 (advancing a positive 
argument in favor of moral realism, particularly in relation to legal institutions). 
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claim “Malcolm has red hair” reports a fact.120 These claims are true 
so long as they correspond to the facts as they are—if they “get the 
facts right.”121 So just as “Malcolm has red hair” is true if and only 
if it corresponds to the factual existence of someone named 
“Malcolm” whose hair is red, the claim “Napalming babies is bad” 
is true if and only if it corresponds to the factual existence of moral 
properties—here “badness”—that reflect it.122 Like empirical facts, 
moral facts are objective. That is, they exist, and claims about them 
are true or false, independent of our opinions, feelings, and 
attitudes about them. If this picture of morality and moral claims 
appeals to you, then you are likely a moral realist.123 
As described, hard-core moral realism is a theory that bears 
upon metaphysics, truth, and language. Moral realism implies a 
form of metaphysical realism. Metaphysics is the philosophical 
investigation of “what there is” or what exists.124 The domain of 
entities that exist is called an “ontology.” Thus, a metaphysical 
realist is a person who believes that there are such things as cats, 
trees, and rocks. This means that she is ontologically committed to 
the existence of such entities—she is committed to an ontology that 
 
 120. Geoff Sayre-McCord, Moral Realism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Oct. 3, 2005), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries 
/moral-realism/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). The first two examples are taken from Arthur 
Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1249 (1979); see also Moral 
Reality, supra note 66; Moral Reality Revisited, supra note 6. 
 121. Sayre-McCord, supra note 120. 
 122. Note that relevant moral properties may vary according to the moral theory to 
which one subscribes—napalming babies may reflect the moral property of badness because 
it violates divine command, because it violates the Categorical Imperative, or because it 
works to the detriment of some objective utilitarian conception of the Good. 
 123. Although belief in moral realism is thought to be naïve or passé in some disciplines 
and academic communities, some form of moral realism—whether it be the robust kind 
described here or a weaker version of it—is still well received by many philosophers. See, 
e.g., PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN, FEAR OF KNOWLEDGE: AGAINST RELATIVISM AND CONSTRUC-
TIVISM (2007). 
 124. See Willard V. Quine, On What There Is, 2 R. METAPHYSICS 21 (1948). This 
description of metaphysics is, of course, abbreviated and inadequate. Unfortunately, 
metaphysics as a discipline resists simple definition because the nature of its questions has 
substantially changed over the course of its history. Ancient and medieval metaphysics 
investigated concepts including “being as such,” “first causes,” and “substance.” In contrast, 
contemporary metaphysics investigates concepts such as modality, space and time, and 
causation as it relates to freedom and determinism. For a more detailed accounting of 
metaphysics’ questions and historical development, see Peter van Inwagen & Meghan 
Sullivan, Metaphysics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Sept. 
10, 2007), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
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includes cats, trees, and rocks.125 The metaphysical realist also 
believes that at least some of the entities within her ontology, such 
as cats, exist objectively,126 though she may admit that some 
entities—like imaginary numbers, unicorns, and square circles—
exist only subjectively. Thus, she believes that cats exist and that 
they would continue to exist independent of any observer’s 
subjective thoughts or opinions about them.127 A full-blooded 
moral realist believes that moral entities exist; therefore, moral 
entities—like “goodness,” “wrongness,” “justice,” and “evil”—
make up at least part of a moral realist’s metaphysical ontology.128 
Thus, the moral realist believes that “evil” exists regardless of her 
or anyone else’s beliefs about it or the individuals or acts that 
embody it. Another way to say this is that the moral realist is a 
metaphysical realist about the class of moral entities. 
Due to its commitment to the existence of moral entities, a fully 
developed theory of moral realism includes theories of truth and 
meaning, which is important for our purposes because of their 
apparent conflict with the claims of Semantic Originalism. 
Michael S. Moore, in his book Educating Oneself in Public: Critical 
Essays in Jurisprudence,129 formulates five aspects of a broad account 
of metaphysical realism that apply to the full-blooded moral realist, 
two of which are important to my argument here.130 First, as has 
been discussed, a realist will have an ontology that maintains that 
moral facts exist and that they are objective.131 And second, the 
hard-core moral realist will hold a causal theory of meaning.132 It is 
 
 125. Alexander Miller, Realism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. 
Zalta ed., July 8, 2002), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/ (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2018). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Not all moral realists are full-blooded ones. Take, for example, quasi-moral 
realists. See, e.g., SIMON BLACKBURN, ESSAYS IN QUASI-REALISM (1993). 
 129. MICHAEL S. MOORE, EDUCATING ONESELF IN PUBLIC: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN JURIS-
PRUDENCE (2000). 
 130. See The Interpretive Turn, supra note 6, at 338. 
 131. See id. at 342. 
 132. Id. at 343. The other three aspects are (1) she will hold a correspondence theory of 
truth, “according to which the meaning of ‘is true’ is given by the correspondence of some 
sentence s to some mind and convention-independent state of affairs[]”; (2) the full-blooded 
moral realist will adhere to a classical theory of logic, which includes the law of non-
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this second aspect of metaphysical and moral realism that flies in 
the face of Semantic Originalism. 
B. Fixing Semantic Content: Natural Kinds and Moral Kinds 
1. What is a causal theory of meaning? 
The causal theory of meaning as developed by Saul Kripke and 
Hilary Putnam “aim[s] to explain meaning in terms of the relations 
between expressions and the objects and properties they 
represent[,]” like the relationship between the word “tiger” and 
actual flesh-and-blood tigers existing in the natural world.133 In 
other words, a causal theory of meaning purports to explain the 
causal connection between word signs and their meanings. For a 
metaphysical realist, such a theory has three basic claims. First, 
terms like “water,” “tigers,” and “polio” refer to natural kinds.134 
Thus, natural kind terms purportedly refer to real—typically 
physical—entities that make up the “furniture of the universe.”135 
Second, the fact that a natural kind exists causes us to assign a name 
to it.136 For instance, because the periodical element gold (Au) exists, 
we give it the common name “gold.” And third, the meaning 
(semantic content) of natural kind terms like “gold” is given by the 
nature and identifying properties of the kind, in this case the 
essential properties of gold.137 In other words, according to the 
realist’s theory, real entities in the world cause the meaning of their 
respective terms. 
One of the most well-known and illustrative arguments in favor 
of causal meaning of natural kinds is Hilary Putnam’s “Twin Earth” 
 
contradiction and the law of excluded middle; and (3) the moral realist will adhere to a truth-
conditional theory of the meaning of sentences. Id. at 342–43. 
 133. Jeff Speaks, Theories of Meaning, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Jan. 26, 2010), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning/#CauOri 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2018); see also SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980); SAUL A. 
KRIPKE, A Puzzle About Belief, in MEANING AND USE (A. Margalit ed., 1979); PUTNAM, supra 
note 118. 
 134. See, e.g., The Interpretive Turn, supra note 6, at 343. 
 135. Id. at 335. 
 136. See id. at 343. 
 137. See id. Again, I will generally use quotation marks—e.g., “gold”—to refer to 
natural or other kind terms, and italics—e.g., gold—to refer to the entity to which the natural 
or other kind term refers. See also supra note 41. 
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thought experiment.138 Putnam presents the hypothetical scenario 
that in 1750 there was a remote planet, Twin Earth.139 Twin Earth 
is, for all intents and purposes, identical to real Earth (our Earth) in 
every way except one: whereas water on real earth is composed of 
H2O molecules, water on Twin Earth is composed of a different 
substance, the chemical compound XYZ.140 Despite this difference 
in molecular structure, all other observable properties of Earth 
water and Twin Earth water are exactly the same: they look, taste, 
feel, and sound the same.141 Moreover, both people on Earth and 
their counterparts on Twin Earth use the term “water” to refer to 
Earth water (“waterE”) and Twin Earth water (“waterTE”), 
respectively. In other words, a casual observer from either world 
would never know the difference between waterE and waterTE.142 In 
fact, because no one on Earth or Twin Earth knew the molecular 
structure of waterE or waterTE, it would be impossible for anyone at 
the time to distinguish them. 
Putnam then posits a “typical Earthian English speaker” named 
Oscar1 and his Twin Earth counterpart, Oscar2.143 Both Oscars are 
exact duplicates: they share the same physical and mental states 
and properties—right down to their inner monologues—including 
those having to do with water.144 But, Putnam claims, the extension 
of “water” on Earth as H2O was no different in 1750 than in 1950, 
just as the extension of “water” on Twin Earth as XYZ was no 
different in 1750 than in 1950.145 Therefore, if Oscar1 had pointed to 
a sample of waterTE and said, “That is water,” he would have made 
a mistake—a semantic error.146 
2. Causal meaning and moral kinds 
Because a full-blooded moral realist is ontologically committed 
to moral facts as real entities, she will similarly hold to a causal 
 
 138. PUTNAM, supra note 118, at 224; see also Joe Lau & Max Deutsch, Externalism About 
Mental Content, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Oct. 21, 
2002), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 139. PUTNAM, supra note 118, at 224. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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meaning theory for terms that denote moral entities. Thus, the 
moral realist adheres to the following claims that parallel those of 
the metaphysical realist: (1) words like “goodness,” “justice,” and 
“equality” refer to the moral kinds of goodness, justice, and equality; 
(2) the fact that moral kinds exist causes us to give them common 
names; and (3) the semantic content of moral kind terms is given by 
the essential properties of its corresponding kind—e.g., the 
meaning of “justice” is fixed by the nature of justice, the entity to 
which it refers. Therefore, according to hard-core moral realism, the 
semantic content of moral kind terms is fixed and given not by 
historical context and conventional usage of the term—as Semantic 
Originalism argues—but by the nature of the moral object, a real 
entity making up part of the world. 
IV. SEMANTIC ORIGINALISM V. MORAL REALISM 
AND CAUSAL MEANING THEORY 
A. The Tension Squarely Stated 
Solum recognizes the potential problem posed to Semantic 
Originalism by moral realism and its implicit commitment to the 
causal theory of meaning: 
[The Constitution] does include several words and phrases that 
could be understood as having moral content, for example, 
“freedom of speech,” “cruel and unusual punishment,” and 
“equal protection of the laws.” . . . 
 If the constitution employs moral kind terms, then moral 
reality and not semantic conventions fixes their meaning given 
conventions that attach a word or phrase to the kind. Conventions 
do the attaching of the word to the moral kind, but moral reality and not 
the convention fixes the nature of the kind.147 
Thus, what is at stake is the central role of the clause meaning 
thesis. In broad terms, the basic narrative of Semantic Originalism 
can be summarized in two propositions: (1) the clause meaning of 
the constitutional text is the law as a matter of linguistic fact;148 
therefore (2) we are morally obligated to follow the clause meaning 
 
 147. Solum, supra note 1, at 94–95 (italics added). 
 148. See id. at 173. 
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of the constitutional text in legal practice.149 If, however, the 
meaning of the constitutional text is largely determined by natural 
or moral kinds (and perhaps even legal kinds), then premise 
(1) fails because the clause meaning is not the law as a matter of 
linguistic fact, and therefore premise (2) would no longer follow. 
What makes this consequence potentially distressing to the 
Semantic Originalist is that contemporary legal practice—both 
interpretation and construction—may effectively ignore the 
original public meaning of the constitutional text wherever the text 
instantiates moral kinds. Just as our understanding of the nature of 
gold is determined by our best scientific theory of the elements, our 
understanding of the nature of “freedom of speech,” “cruel and 
unusual punishment,” and “equal protection under the law” will 
have to be determined by our best moral theories. Solum suggests 
that “person” is a natural kind term,150 but the question of “What 
constitutes a person?” is one that is deeply embedded in some of 
our fiercest moral debates. “Person” appears throughout the 
constitutional text, so the implications of understanding “person” 
as a moral kind appear to have potentially dramatic consequences 
for constitutional practice in contemporary legal debates. 
B. The Compatibility of Clause Meaning and Natural/Moral Kinds 
Surprisingly, Solum’s primary response is not that meta-
physical and moral realism are wrong, nor that natural and moral 
kinds do not exist, nor that the causal theory of meaning is 
deficient—indeed, he does not criticize any aspect of these theories 
except to acknowledge that they might seem “radical” on first 
blush.151 Instead, he argues that apparent conflict is not genuine; it 
is a complication, but one that can be solved by a modification to 
the theory, much like the modification of constitutional implicature 
or constitutional stipulations.152 
To demonstrate the compatibility of clause meaning and 
natural kinds, Solum presents a thought experiment involving a 
hypothetical gradual shift in meaning of the constitutional term 
 
 149. See id. 
 150. Id. at 94. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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“speech.”153 “Speech” can plausibly be understood to be a natural 
kind term referring to “oral human communication defined in 
terms of naturally occurring human capacities to produce sounds 
and linguistic capacities that are inherent to the human species.”154 
Solum invites us to imagine that, over the course of time, “speech” 
gradually comes to be used to refer to the lyrics of rap music.155 
After even more time, and more deviant uses, “speech” loses its old 
meaning and now refers only to the beat of rap music.156 According 
to Solum, the role of conventional use—clause meaning—is readily 
apparent: although the semantic content of the First Amendment 
would remain the same, referring to the natural kind, conventional 
use has given the word “speech” new meaning.157 Inasmuch as this 
is true, both theories of meaning are correct, both are compatible, 
and “the relationship is a function of [the] complex set of conven-
tions that constitute the natural language English.”158 
The problem with Solum’s example is that it does not really 
save Semantic Originalism qua Semantic Originalism—the robust 
theory of clause meaning as the true meaning of the Constitution as 
a matter of linguistic fact. The clause meaning thesis holds that the 
semantic content of the Constitution is fixed, or given, by its 
ordinary public meaning at the time of its adoption. Thus, the 
clause meaning thesis is true only if original public meaning—and 
not something else—fixes the semantic content of a constitutional 
provision. In Solum’s example, however, the semantic content is 
not fixed by the original public meaning of “speech.” Rather, it is 
fixed by the natural kind speech. Moreover, “speech” in its new 
sense, beat, seems not to be referring to a conventional meaning but 
instead to a new natural kind: the beat of rap music and its essential 
properties, whatever those are. In turn, Semantic Originalism—or 
more specifically clause meaning—merely assists us in identifying 
which natural kind we should look to. 
Putnam makes essentially the same point in his Twin 
Earth argument: 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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 Note that there is no problem about the extension of the term 
‘water’. The word simply has two different meanings (as we say): 
in the sense in which it is used on Twin Earth, the sense of waterTE, 
what we call ‘water’ simply isn’t water; while in the sense in which 
it is used on Earth, the sense of waterE, what the Twin Earthians 
call ‘water’ simply isn’t water. The extension of ‘water’ in the 
sense of waterE is the set of all wholes consisting of H2O 
molecules, or something like that; the extension of water in the 
sense of waterTE is the set of all wholes consisting of X Y Z 
molecules, or something like that.159 
Thus, continuing Putnam’s example, if we were to compare 
written texts from Earth and Twin Earth discussing “water,” the 
clause meaning would be helpful only as a means to identify 
whether we should understand “water” to refer to waterE or 
waterTE: the ordinary public meaning of “water” on Earth would 
pick out waterE, while on Twin Earth it would pick out waterTE. But 
the semantic content—or as Putnam says, the “extension”—of 
“water” in either instance is determined by the referred to natural 
kind (either H2O or XYZ). Likewise, returning to Solum’s example, 
if we were to compare the constitutional text to a text from Solum’s 
hypothetical future, clause meaning would be helpful only to 
identify which natural kind, speech or beat, we should look to in 
order to provide relevant semantic content. 
If this is correct, then the only work that conventional meaning 
appears to be doing is to help disambiguate which sense of a word 
is being used; or rather, which natural kind fills the word’s 
semantic content. This is to assign a completely different role to 
original public meaning. And it is one that displaces the central role 
of clause meaning as the essential provider of semantic content. 
Solum’s accommodation has placed natural kinds and causal 
meaning center stage in the theatre of interpretation and has 
reassigned original public meaning’s role from lead to usher. 
C. The “Essential Thrust” of Semantic Originalism 
A better example that Solum gives involves the term “freedom 
of speech.”160 It is possible that “freedom of speech” is ambiguous. 
 
 159. PUTNAM, supra note 118, at 224. 
 160. Solum, supra note 1, at 95 n.274. 
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It may be a moral kind term, but it might have also been the case 
that the original public meaning referred to “a different entity”: 
“the conception of freedom of speech embodied in legal prac-
tice.”161 This second sense would be a meaning given by the 
conventions of legal practice. Bracketing the question of legal 
kinds,162 Solum’s basic argument is that even if we accept that 
natural and moral kinds fix the meaning of the constitutional text, 
they do not exhaust the meaning of the Constitution because there 
are still provisions whose meaning will be conventionally 
defined.163 So long as this is true, then the clause meaning thesis and 
Semantic Originalism still hold true. 
The reason, then, that Solum does not see natural and moral 
kinds to be threatening to Semantic Originalism is that the 
implications of a causal theory of meaning are in line with Semantic 
Originalism’s ultimate goal: “The essential thrust of the view 
argued for [Semantic Originalism] requires only that the Consti-
tution have semantic content that is not indeterminate.”164 A causal 
semantic theory of natural and moral kinds is one that claims that 
meanings are determinate because natural and moral reality never 
“run out.” Thus, “there is always a ‘fact of the matter’ regarding the 
correct application of a natural kind term.”165 
If this is truly all that Semantic Originalism is after—
interpretation governed by determinate linguistic facts, whatever 
those facts may turn out to be—then he is correct, and a causal 
semantic theory of natural and moral (and legal) kinds poses no 
threat. So long as something—anything—is doing the hard labor of 
meaning fixation, causal meaning and clause meaning and all other 
theories of determinate meaning coexist peacefully in the grand 
work of defining the constitutional text. But the scope and depth of 
Solum’s arguments speak to a purpose much more ambitious than 
that modest claim. The premises of Semantic Originalism purport, 
not to stand like a fair attendant to ensure that semantic theories 
 
 161. Id. at 95 n.274. 
 162. It may turn out that the survival of Semantic Originalism, and of the clause 
meaning thesis in particular, depends on its ability to resist increasingly realist commitments 
to causal entities. 
 163. See Solum, supra note 1, at 94. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. Michael Moore calls this the “‘right answer’ thesis.” The Interpretive Turn, supra 
note 6, at 338–39. 
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meet the minimum height requirements to ride the grand train of 
constitutional interpretation, but to demonstrate what the relevant 
linguistic facts really are. That is, Solum wrote his comprehensive 
173-page article to convince us that clause meaning really is the 
supreme law of the land embodied in the constitutional text. As 
such, Semantic Originalism is no less than original public meaning 
originalism’s claim to the throne by the immutable right of 
linguistic fact. Because of this, to accommodate moral kinds by 
accepting that Semantic Originalism or the clause meaning thesis is 
one—not even first—among equals in the way that Solum suggests 
is, it seems to me, to essentially give up the game. 
A modification to Semantic Originalism to “absorb”166 natural 
and moral kinds into the clause meaning thesis cannot rightly be 
understood as a minor alteration. The other modifications to the 
clause meaning thesis—publicly available constitutional context, 
division of linguistic labor, constitutional implicature, and 
constitutional stipulation—are all acceptable amendments to the 
clause meaning thesis because none of them displaces clause 
meaning as the ultimate source of semantic content. Even consti-
tutional implicature, according to which the Constitution may have 
legitimate semantic content that is not found within the text itself, 
still appears to depend on some form of discerning semantic 
content via conventional meaning. However, an amendment to 
account for natural and moral kinds does not help to refine the 
application of clause meaning—it overrides it. The claim that the 
meaning of the Constitution is fixed at the time of its adoption by 
the conventional understanding of its provisions must now be 
modified to become a much more modest claim: that the meaning 
of the Constitution is fixed by linguistic facts, whatever they are. 
And once the conceptual space for alternative means of fixing 
meaning is opened up, the role of clause meaning logically 
diminishes as our best linguistic theories present more ways to fix 
the semantic content of language. The clause meaning thesis will 
always be on the run, so to speak. 
The picture of a Semantic Originalism that accommodates a 
causal theory of meaning then looks substantially different. It 
might be portrayed along the lines of these modified theses: 
 
 166. Solum, supra note 1, at 95. 
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(1) The semantic meaning of constitutional provisions is 
fixed by linguistic facts; 
(2) The original public meaning of constitutional provisions 
is a clue to determining what those linguistic facts are; 
(3) The semantic meaning of the Constitution given by 
those linguistic facts contributes to the law; 
(4) Because the semantic meaning of the Constitution is the 
supreme law of the land, we are obligated by them 
barring contrary moral factors. 
Notice that theses (3) and (4) are equivalents to the contribution 
thesis and the fidelity thesis, but theses (1) and (2) are substantially 
different from their counterparts. Thesis (1), like the fixation thesis, 
claims that the semantic meaning of constitutional provisions is 
fixed by linguistic facts, but it leaves open what those facts are, so 
it can accommodate a variety of different linguistic theories. One 
can imagine that these facts will be filled with assertions about the 
properties of various kinds of terms: the semantic content of natural 
kind and moral kind terms is causal and determined by the nature 
of those kinds, the semantic content of conventional kinds is deter-
mined by the conventions at the time of utterance, and so on. Thesis 
(2) is a substantial modification to the clause meaning thesis—it 
maintains an important role for original public meaning, but that 
role is not the fixation of semantic meaning. Its role is limited to that 
of a tool to help determine the relevant linguistic facts. 
Thus, Semantic Originalism can be squared with moral realism 
only by removing from Semantic Originalism its most characteristic 
feature—that the semantic meaning of the constitutional text is the 
ordinary public meaning of its provisions at the time it was drafted 
and ratified, and that we are bound by this recovered meaning. The 
upshot of this new version of Semantic Originalism is not that it 
demonstrates that the current version of Semantic Originalism is 
false, but rather that Semantic Originalism has its conceptual 
priorities misplaced. In other words, clause meaning is not elimi-
nated, it has just been removed from its pedestal. Room must be 
made for the complex conventions of natural language and the 
variety of ways it achieves fixed semantic meaning. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The topic of this Comment sits at the intersection of legal 
theory, philosophy of language, metaethics, and metaphysics. I 
take this to be an inescapable result of a few nearly incontestable 
facts. First, constitutional law is the supreme law of the land and 
cannot be ignored. Second, law is given in legal texts, which are a 
subset of all texts, which is itself a subset of language, so a deficient 
understanding of what language is and how it works will neces-
sarily lead to a deficiency in our legal practice and, likely, in the 
legislation of new laws. Third, law is inherently normative, and 
normativity falls in the domain of ethics and metaethics. And 
finally, we all live in a world together and our understanding of 
anything is going to be dictated in no small part by that world and 
what we believe that world to consist of. 
The essential premise at the heart of Semantic Originalism is the 
claim that, as a theory of interpretation, it gets to the heart of 
constitutional law as a matter of linguistic fact. That is, to disagree 
with Semantic Originalism is to disagree with an understanding of 
what the constitutional text literally means. The meaning of the 
text, according to Semantic Originalism, is its ordinary public 
meaning at the time of its adoption. However, inasmuch as the 
Constitution makes use of moral terms like “person” or “equal 
protection,” and insofar as one is committed to moral facts and 
values as independent and objective entities, Semantic Originalism 
fails to adequately account for the actual meaning of those terms. 
And an attempt to modify Semantic Originalism to account for the 
existence of objective moral reality fundamentally displaces orig-
inal public meaning as the governing principle of constitutional 
interpretation and construction. 
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